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Abstract  
This study contributes to the existing risk disclosure literature in emerging economies, 
in particular Saudi Arabia (SA), by examining the levels of risk disclosure in the annual 
reports of both Islamic and non-Islamic listed banks. This investigation uses a manual 
content analysis method to examine all Saudi listed banks from 2009 to 2013. This 
study also develops two holistic risk disclosure indices to measure the levels of risk 
disclosure in both Islamic and non-Islamic banks. 
 
The empirical analysis shows that Islamic banks report less risk information than non-
Islamic banks. However, the analysis also reveals that both Islamic and non-Islamic 
banks report relatively the same amount of risk information regarding the banks’ 
universal items. Furthermore, the empirical analysis shows that Islamic banks report 
very low risk disclosure items. The study’s findings have practical implications. They 
inform the regulators about the current level of risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks 
(Islamic and non-Islamic). For example, the findings show that Islamic banks report 
less risk information than their non-Islamic counterparts. The practical implications for 
managers from these findings are that in order to keep investors satisfied, banks with 
low levels of risk disclosure should enhance their reporting practices. This will help 
investors when making investment decisions.   
 
To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, no prior research has previously been 
conducted on the levels of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabian listed banks. Therefore, 
this is the first study to examine the levels of risk disclosure in the context of Saudi 
Arabia.   
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Introduction      
Recently, considerable attention has been paid to investigating and improving 
corporate risk disclosure (CRD) (Oliveira et al., 2013). The goal of a great number of 
companies is to disclose sufficient information in their annual reports to satisfy their 
various shareholders' needs. However, there is a developing debate on the 
inadequacy of risk disclosure and the lack of full transparency from companies in this 
respect (Oliveira et al., 2011a; 2013). There have been demands for even greater 
disclosure to reduce asymmetries of access to corporate information and ensure 
shareholders are fully able to assess information on a company's performance 
(Oliveira et al., 2013). Risk disclosure is one aspect of these disclosure demands. 
Shareholders have become more interested in risk profiles to better understand the 
risks a company faces and how the managers are dealing with those risks as well as 
to improve the measurement and disclosure of risk-related matters (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Konishi and Mohobbot, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2013). 
 
To date, there has been an inadequate amount of research on corporate risk 
disclosures (Beasley et al., 2005; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Lajili, 2009). However, this 
lack of research is even greater in developing countries since all of the risk disclosure 
investigations have been restricted to the developed world, for example, German, 
Dutch and Anglo-Saxon countries (see Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorion, 
2002; Solomon et al., 2000; Dhanani, 2003; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Linsley, Shrives 
and Crumpton, 2006; Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes 
and Knechel, 2008; Iatridis, 2008; Lajili, 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013) and Europe 
and Latin America (see Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 
2006; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011; 2013; 
Madrigal et al., 2012; Miihkinen, 2013; Maffei et al., 2014). Notwithstanding the work 
of Amran et al. (2009), Mokhtar and Melett (2013), Elkelish and Hassan (2014) Hassan 
(2009; 2014) and Al-Shammari (2014), who investigated the determinants of risk 
disclosure in the UAE and Kuwait, very little attention has been given to the risk 
reporting practices of publicly listed banks in emerging economies. Therefore, little is 
known about the CRD in Arab countries in general and Saudi in particular. This study 
seeks to investigate the levels of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks in an attempt to 
fill the gap.  
 
As discussed above, most previous risk disclosure work has concentrated on 
developed economies. However, it would be beneficial to investigate risk disclosure 
practices in a developing economy since developing markets have larger behavioural 
variations, and thus any research on them would contribute to the disclosure literature. 
Developed economies are efficient, have greater compliance, robust regulatory 
structures, developed corporate governance structures and financial reporting 
systems. Conversely, developing markets are less efficient and suffer from a lack of 
compliance, regulations, enforcement and transparency (Richardson and Welker, 
2001). However, this research aims to contribute to the existing literature and fill the 
gap by examining the extent of risk disclosure in a sample of Saudi listed banks in the 
context of an emerging economy, Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, what makes this 
research even more interesting is that Saudi Arabia has a secretive culture, where 
corporations release little information regarding their business affairs and risk 
disclosures (Roberts and Kamla, 2010). 
 
Saudi Arabia is the focus of this study because of its unique socio-economic context. 
Firstly, Saudi Arabia is the largest emerging capital market that adopts an open 
economic philosophy based on the market economy and liberalization of trade (AMF, 
2013). Secondly, the Saudi government has initiated several far-reaching reforms at 
the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawal) to mobilize domestic savings and attract foreign 
capital investment. These measures include the privatization of state corporations. 
Thirdly, Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest emerging economies in the world, 
having the largest stock market in the Middle East (Piesse et al., 2012). Also, the Saudi 
stock market is now the largest in the Arab world as far as capitalization is concerned 
and is becoming an important capital market in the region. Fourthly, compared to other 
countries with advanced capital markets, the Saudi accountancy profession is lagging 
behind in terms of offering professional certificates. Finally, the Saudi regulatory 
framework incorporates different legislation that requires the disclosure of risk related 
information in the corporations’ annual reports. All the above reasons make 
investigating the extent of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia an important issue. 
 
Furthermore, this study makes some important contributions to the field. Firstly, it 
contributes to the understanding of the nature of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
Secondly, it contributes to existing risk reporting literature by being the first study to 
investigate the levels of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. Thirdly, it contributes to 
the literature on risk disclosure by investigating the differences between the risk 
disclosure practices of Islamic and non-Islamic banks in a rapidly developing emerging 
market.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia; 
section 3 discusses the theoretical framework; section 4 reviews previous literature on 
the quantity of risk disclosure; section 5 discusses the methodology, criteria for the 
selection of the sample banks, the employment of annual reports and the data 
collection procedure; section 6 presents and analyses the empirical findings; and 
section 7 outlines the conclusion, limitations and further research.  
Risk Disclosure in Saudi Arabia 
Financial reporting regulations in Saudi Arabia are created and managed by the 
government. They focus on protecting investors and other users of financial reports. 
The main bodies issuing rules are the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA), the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) and Companies Law (1965).  The latter are considered to 
be the main bodies monitoring publicly traded Saudi companies. Regulating, 
supervising and registering are some of the most important responsibilities of the 
above-mentioned bodies, which ensure that Saudi companies comply with national 
regulations. Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry indirectly performs a 
supervisory role over many monitoring devices, such as the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (CMA), the Saudi Stock Exchange and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA).  
 
Furthermore, the role of the CMA is to regulate and develop Saudi companies by 
providing appropriate rules and regulations that contribute to increasing investment 
and enhancing transparency and disclosure standards as well as protecting investors 
and dealers from illegal activities in the market (CMA, 2007). Regulations on 
transparency and disclosure are the most important to have been issued by the Capital 
Market Authority.  
 
Saudi Arabia has become one of the largest emerging economies in the world, and it 
has the largest stock market in the Middle East (Piesse et al., 2012). Also, the Saudi 
stock market is now the largest in the Arab world as far as capitalization is concerned, 
and Saudi Capital Market growth between 1996 and 2005 was high, with a huge 
increase in the number of transactions, volume and value trading. For example, listed 
firms increased in number from 77 in 2005 to 145 in December 2010, with a market 
capitalization of about $353bn, representing nearly 44% of the total Arab stock market 
capitalization (SFG, 2009; Hearn et al., 2011; Tadawul, 2012). Accordingly, the Saudi 
market may not be active in terms of corporate risk disclosure and may suffer from 
greater information deficits in comparison with established markets, such as the US, 
the UK and Europe. Although the Saudi stock market is very large compared to the 
markets of other developing countries, recent studies have found that, like those of 
most developing countries, it is not efficient (Dahel, 1999; Onour, 2004).  
 
This study looks at Saudi Arabia because very little is known about the financial risk 
reporting in this country. Some cultural characteristics of Saudi Arabia, such as the 
strong hierarchical social structure, the importance of kinship and personal 
relationships, religion, the importance of professionalism, accountability and trust, and 
the nature of some of its socio-economic institutions, are similar to other developing 
countries and can provide insights into those countries that share similar 
characteristics. The findings of this research should be of interest not only to academic 
researchers interested in examining the uniqueness of risk disclosure issues in a 
country but also to practitioners and policy makers in Saudi Arabia and other Middle-
Eastern and developing countries that share a similar socio-economic environment as 
it has important policy implications. 
 
The study is justified on the following grounds. Firstly, it provides a starting point for 
research involving corporate risk disclosure in the Saudi context. It is one of the first 
empirical studies to use the unweighted disclosure index approach to investigate the 
levels of voluntary corporate risk disclosures in the annual reports of listed Saudi 
banks. Secondly, relatively little is known about risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia, and 
thus it may make a general contribution to this area. Thirdly, this empirical investigation 
could benefit investors and regulators. Fourthly, it may help in studying other capital 
markets in the area, especially the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states 
and other Middle-Eastern countries, and thus may contribute to the accounting 
literature in emerging markets. 
Theoretical framework 
As argued earlier in the theoretical framework chapter a number of scholars have 
defined risk disclosure differently. Therefore, it is important to take on a fit for purpose 
definition here since taking on an inappropriate definition could lead to different 
analysis and results. Moreover, risk disclosure practices profoundly rest on numerous 
factors such as, culture, legal, political, economic and regulations. The ICAEW (1999) 
indicated that risk divulging in annual reports should include “information about risks 
in the broadest sense, about actions to manage them and relevant measures”. Though, 
some researchers have defined risk reporting as informative news in annual financial 
reports concerning managers’ estimates, judgments and reliance on market based 
accounting policies, such as impairment, derivative hedging, financial instruments, 
economic, political, financial, management of risks and internal control of risks 
(Hassan 2009 and Miihkinen 2012).  
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the investigator has chosen a well-defined 
and appropriate risk disclosure definition by Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.3), who 
defined risk reporting as “If the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect or of 
any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or exposure, which has already impacted upon the 
company or may impact upon the company in the future or of the management of any 
such opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”. The subsequent section 
considers the theory selected for the purpose of this examination.   
Signaling theory has been developed by Spence (1973) as a means of describing 
people’s behaviour in labour markets (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It has also 
been a universal phenomenon valid in any market with information asymmetries 
(Morris, 1987). A number of academic researchers have employed signaling theory in 
previous empirical disclosure investigations to explain why managers are motivated to 
report more information news in annual report narratives (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Hassan, 2009; Al-Shammari, 2014). Based on this theory, managers disclose 
adequate information in the financial reports to convey specific signals to current and 
potential users. Hughes (1986) argued that this kind of communication is credible to 
the investors because they know that managers who send out fraudulent signals will 
be penalized. In this investigation, signaling theory is used to explain the possible 
variations in the level of voluntary risk disclosure in the annual reports of the sampled 
banks.  
 
Descriptive risk disclosure is recognized as an important element in making firm 
reporting more valuable to shareholders (Miihkinen, 2012; Mokhtar and Mellet, 2013; 
Maffei et al, 2014). In order to improve firm descriptive risk disclosure, regulators and 
standard setters have attempted to advance a compound set of standards, demanding 
more information on different forms of risks (Dobler et al., 2011). However, firms still 
offer inadequate risk information (ICAEW, 2011). Similarly, the far-reaching research 
on this subject agrees that risk reporting practices are not beneficial for investors as 
such practices are not really comprehensive, in depth, forward-looking or adequate for 
the valuation of the total risk profile (Paaple and Spekle, 2012; Magna and Markarian, 
2011) nor are they relevant for decision-making procedures (Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004). Also, there is general agreement in the literature regarding the inadequacies of 
current risk reporting. The literature on this issue is far from complete (Woods et al., 
2007; Maffei et al, 2014) since very little of the current research on risk reporting has 
empirically examined risk disclosure (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Miihkinen, 2012). 
Literature 
The literature on the measurement of risk disclosure is profuse (Dobler, Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2011; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Miihkinen, 2012; Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013; Elshandidy, et al., 2013; Nitm, Lindop and Thomas, 2013; Al-
Shammari, 2014; Lipunga, 2014; Campbell et al., 2014; Elshandidy, et al., 2015; 
Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015). However, none of the previous studies have 
measured the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Thus, this is the first 
study that measures risk disclosure levels in Saudi Arabia. Many studies have 
measured risk disclosure in developed economies as this is what the generally rely 
upon (Beretta and Bozalan, 2004; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 
2009; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). Similarly, there were some studies in emerging 
markets, which mostly rely upon voluntary risk disclosure (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 
2009; Hassan, 2009; Hemrit and Ben Arab, 2011; Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013; Nitm, 
Lindop and Thomas, 2013; Soodanian, Navid and Kheirollahi, 2013; Al-Shammari, 
2014 Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015). However, none of the previous studies 
have examined voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabian banks. Hence, this 
investigation will contribute to the existing literature on developing economies by 
examining voluntary risk disclosure in a new environment, namely Saudi Arabia.  
While nonfinancial and mixed institutions in developed countries have been widely 
researched and reported upon in the literature (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2005; Combes-Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Dobler, Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 
2015), only a few studies have focused on banks and financial institutions in developed 
countries (Solomon et al., 2000; Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006; Oliveira, 
Rodrigues and Craig, 2011a;  Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Maffei et al., 2014) and 
no prior investigations have been conducted purely on banks or financial institutions 
in developing markets (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdallah and 
Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elamir 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdallah, Hassan and 
McClelland, 2015). Therefore, this is the only study that investigates the levels of 
voluntary risk disclosure in banks in developing economies, particularly in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Furthermore, whilst a small number of studies have examined risk disclosure over 
more than a one year period in developed economies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; 
Deumes, 2008; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Elshandidy, 
Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), none have examined risk disclosure over more than a 
one year period in developing economies (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 
2009; Abdallah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elmir, 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; 
Abdallah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015). Therefore, the current study is the only 
study that examines voluntary risk disclosure over a period of five years in developing 
economies.   
Preceding literature examining the level of risk disclosure is very limited and focuses 
on research carried out in the West. This could be attributed to the early 
implementation of regulatory measures by firms and increased complexity of making 
investment decisions by investors in these countries. A comprehensive review of the 
literature shows that two methods are generally used to measure the level of risk 
reporting. The first method employs words as a recording unit to measure risk 
reporting levels (Abraham and Cox, 2007), and the second approach employs self-
constructed indices (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Alshammari, 2014). Therefore, this 
investigation aims to quantify voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks by using 
a self-constructed risk disclosure index. This approach is based on an un-weighed 
content analysis method, which counts risk words (which have been previously 
identified in the self-constructed risk disclosure index - see appendix) within banks’ 
annual reports to measure the level voluntary of risk disclosure. This is consistent with 
a number of prior studies (Al-Shammari, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Dobler 
et al., 2011; Oliveira et al., 2011a; Amran et al., 2009; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Lajili 
and Zeghal, 2005).  
 Linsley and Shrives (2003) confirmed that German and UK firms report equal levels of 
risk information. Yet, the authors revealed that only a few quantitative disclosures are 
reported in the annual reports of the firms from both countries. They also documented 
that the most reported category is “non-monetary/future”.  
 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) examined risk disclosure practices in 85 annual reports 
of non-financial firms listed on the Italian Stock Market. They concentrated on the 
Management Discussion and Analyst section (MDA). The authors identified 75 risk 
items that are reported in the MDA section and documented that firms avoid conveying 
any anticipated effect of risks and the economic direction of the firms in quantitative 
terms. They also illustrated that firms are not willing to show whether reported future 
risks will affect them positively or negatively and affirmed that such firms were prone 
to report past and present risks rather than future risks.    
 
Linsley and Shrives (2005) investigated 79 annual reports of non-financial UK listed 
firms employing a content analysis method. They reported that the most reported risk 
categories are strategic, financial and integrity risks. They also stated that there is 
minimal exposure of quantified risk information and a considerable quantity of risk 
exposure is incorporated in the general statements on their risk policy.   
 
Mohobbot’s (2005) study included 90 non-financial corporations, which were randomly 
selected from the Tokyo stock market. He documented that most corporations would 
rather report descriptive risk information and are not willing to quantify risks in their 
annual reports. The author also reported large variations in the levels of risk disclosure 
practices among the sample corporations.   
 
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) examined risk disclosure in the annual reports of 300 TSE 
Canadian corporations against 12 risk factors. They reported significant variations in 
disclosure quantity on risk sources and management and a lack of uniformity, 
quantification and forward-looking risk disclosure. They also showed that financial risk 
was the most regularly reported by the sample firms, which consisted of information 
on operations in foreign currencies. This study also documented that firms’ disclosures 
were almost always qualitative in nature and lacked specificity and depth.   
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) explored risk disclosure in the annual reports of 79 non-
financial FTSE 100 firms. The authors disaggregated risk disclosure into two 
categories. Firstly, according to six risk factors: financial, operational, empowerment, 
information processing and technology, integrity and strategy. Secondly, according to 
three narrative groups: upside/downside risk, monetary/non-monetary risk and 
past/future risk. By employing a content analysis method to measure the level of risk 
disclosure, they quantified 6,168 risk sentences that were consistent with the prior 
study undertaken by Lajili and Zeghal (2005). Most of the sample firms’ disclosures 
were qualitative, with only a few being quantitative, the majority of reported statements 
were on general risk management policy and there was a dearth of coherence in the 
risk narratives, indicating that risk information gaps are existent. With such reporting, 
shareholders are unable to effectively evaluate the risk profile of a firm.   
 
Linsley et al. (2006) studied risk disclosure in the baking industry through an 
examination of the annual reports of 18 UK and Canadian banks. The authors 
constructed a cording grid based upon the risk disclosure groups set forth by the Basel 
committee in pillar 3 “Market Discipline”. They reported that the characteristics known 
to be more beneficial relative to risk information disclosures are quantitative and 
future-oriented information, which are reported less frequently than qualitative and 
past information in the annual reports of the sample banks of both countries.   
 
Konishi and Mohobbot (2007) investigated factors influencing the level of risk 
disclosure in 100 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo stock exchange 
market. They employed a manual content analysis method to measure the extent of 
risk disclosure. They discovered that firms almost always reported descriptive risk 
information and were unwilling to quantify risk. They also documented that the sample 
firms disclosed more good news than bad/neutral news.  
 
Amran et al. (2009) investigated risk disclosure in 100 non-financial Malaysian 
corporation annual reports, repeating the methodology employed by Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) in the UK. They also relied on counting the number of sentences 
dedicated to the discussion of risk information as a representation of the level of risk 
exposure. They employed the stakeholder theory to connect corporations’ attributes 
to the amount of risk exposure and explain their empirical findings. The total number 
of sentences dedicated to discussion of risk information by the sampled Malaysian 
firms was very low when compared with a 2006 study done by Linsley and Shrives in 
the UK. 
 
Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig (2011a) claimed that the implementation of IAS/IFRS 
had led to a better flow of risk related information but still had not guaranteed better 
transparency in the Portuguese banking sector. Although most banks revealed 
information about how they quantified and evaluated performance in managing market 
risks, only about one third reported quantitative information on market risk exposure 
and performance.   
 
 Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig (2011b) affirmed that the implementation of IAS/IFRS 
and the European Union’s Modernisation Directive in 2005 did not have a positive 
impact on the quantity and quality of risk disclosure in listed  Portuguese corporations. 
Their disclosures were generic, qualitative and backward looking. Although the 
authors claimed that quantitative and forward looking information would be more 
appropriate to shareholders’ decision needs, they found that such disclosures were 
less common due to potential inaccuracy and exposure to litigation costs.    
 
Dobler et al. (2011) examined the extent of risk exposure in 160 non-financial 
corporations from the US, Canada, the UK and Germany. Using a content analysis 
method for designated annual reports, they reported a consistent pattern where risk 
exposure was most dominant in management. The report focused on financial risk 
categories and contained little quantitative and forward looking exposure across the 
sample countries. In terms of risk exposure quantity, US corporations generally led, 
followed by German then UK ones.  
 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) examined the extent of risk disclosure in 72 non-
financial companies in the UK. Content analysis was used to quantify risk disclosure. 
They found that large companies were more likely to report more risk related-
information in their narratives.  
 Mousa and Elamir (2013) explored the nature of risk disclosure within the annual 
reports of 46 listed firms on the Bahrain Bourse. Their study concentrated on all 
narrative sections in the annual reports, including the notes and accounts, and only 
examined the quantity of risk disclosure rather than the quality. One of the main 
findings of their study was that risk disclosures are very limited in the annual reports 
of the examined Bahraini firms.  
 
Al-Shammari (2014) investigated firm specific traits and corporate risk disclosure in 
the annual reports of a sample of 109 Kuwaiti listed non-financial companies. The 
author employed a manual content analysis approach to measure risk disclosure by 
counting the number of risk-related sentences in annual reports. The findings of this 
study indicated that the quantity of risk disclosures for all categories of risks was very 
limited in the annual reports of the sampled companies. 
Methodology 
This section describes the research methodology of the study, including the selection 
of representative banks, criteria, data collection and techniques employed.  
Research paradigm  
Understanding the philosophical stance or research paradigm is essential since it 
provides the researcher with guidance to identify which research design is fit for 
purpose to accomplish the research objectives (Easterby-Smith et al., 1994). 
Therefore, the preferred choice of paradigm for this research is the positivism 
paradigm, which claims that knowledge is best expressed objectively using 
determined theories that are based upon laws and facts. Such a paradigm prefers to 
measure knowledge using quantitative methods to approve or disprove theories 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, this investigation takes a quantitative approach to 
examining the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks over a 5-year 
period. 
Sample 
There are 24 banks in Saudi Arabia which are divided into two sets of banks. The first 
set of banks represents the 12 local banks. The second set of banks represents the 
12 subsidiaries’ of foreign banks licensed to operate in the kingdom. The second set 
of banks is excluded from this study since their annual reports are a part of the mother 
bank, thus there is not a separate annual report dedicated to the subsidiaries (SAMA, 
2014).     
Moreover, the sample of the current investigation consists of 12 local listed banks on 
Tadawul in Saudi Arabia. Where, listed Islamic banks from Saudi Arabia will form the 
foundation of the Islamic bank’s data sources, while non-Islamic banks will form the 
foundation of the conventional bank’s data sources. According to the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency, there are only 12 listed local banks on the Saudi exchange market 
today. Four of these are entirely Islamic, and the other eight are conventional with 
Islamic banking windows. Accordingly, the researcher can state that a total of 12 listed 
banks meet the selection criteria for this investigation. 
This study covers a five-year period to examine voluntary risk disclosure levels in 
Saudi listed banks. This allows the researcher to identify any changes in the levels of 
risk disclosure that may have occurred over the period. The selected annual reports 
are from 2009 to 2013. 
Data collection 
The nature of this investigation dictates the use of secondary data. As argued by 
Bryman and Bell (2011), secondary data sources deliver good quality data and involve 
minimal resources when executing the data collection phase. Therefore, it is the 
researcher’s belief that the examination of secondary data will provide the required 
answers for this investigation.   
Annual reports for the 12 listed Saudi banks are downloaded from the banks’ websites 
and the Saudi Arabian Stock market (Tadawul).  
The employment of annual reports as the main source of research data  
Prior investigations in the field of risk disclosure have concentrated on the employment 
of annual report narratives as the main source of data (e.g. Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 
2010; Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Miihkinen, 2012; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; 
Elshandidy, et al., 2013; Al-Shammari, 2014; Elshandidy, et al., 2015). Moreover, they 
are the fundamental form of communications that organizations employ to convey 
messages to their investors (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Holland, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, there is a substantial amount of support in the accounting disclosure 
literature for the examination of disclosure exercises through employing annual report 
narratives.  Accordingly, Gray, Kouhy and lavers (1995a; 1995b) stated that 
constitutional regulations oblige organizations to publish their annual reports 
periodically due to their significance and the provision of their consistent historical 
image of a company. Moreover, Hines (1988) claimed that annual reports are the most 
pivotal document for providing a company’s social picture. A complementary argument 
was put forward by Tilt (1994), who stated that organizations can symbolically 
communicate views and values to appropriate investors through their reports. 
Campbell (2000) presented two more reasons to support the employment of annual 
reports. Firstly, annual reports are the most extensively distributed of all other 
documents of an organization made public. Secondly, the organization’s management 
has comprehensive editorial power over the voluntary disclosure of information in the 
published annual reports. Also, Tay and Parker (1990) confirmed that genuine 
disclosure practices can be measured more accurately from annual report narratives.   
Content Analysis 
Content analysis has been broadly used in social accounting research (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989; Milne and Adler, 1999; Parker, 2005; Kamla, 2007). These studies 
analyse the information content disclosed in annual reports and acknowledge definite 
words and themes within the textual material (Beattie et al., 2004; Brennan, 2001). 
When analysing the content of a written document, words, phrases and sentences are 
coded against a specific schema of interest (Bowman, 1984). Krippendorff (1980: p. 
21) described content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from data”. Furthermore, Bowman (1984) claimed that content 
analysis is able to collect rich data since it can reveal relationships that other 
techniques cannot. However, a weakness of content analysis is that it is subjective 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Therefore, validation practices are often used to override 
this problem (Bowman, 1984).  
 
Additionally, content analysis can be carried out using either manual or automatic 
methods or a combination of the two. Many studies have used the manual method to 
conduct content analysis (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006) despite the labour-intensive data collection process, which 
limits the sample size (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Automated content analysis was 
first used in the 1980s, and with the creation of different content analysis software, it 
is constantly developing. It is often the method chosen when the sample size is larger 
(Frazier, Ingram and Tennyson, 1984; Breton and Taffler, 2001; Kothari, Li and Short, 
2009). Other researchers have used both manual and automated content analysis 
methods (Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; 
Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Hence, this paper employs a manual content analysis 
method to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed bank.  
Development of Risk Disclosure indices 
For this investigation to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed 
banks a risk disclosure index, which is a checklist of different disclosure items included 
in banks’ annual reports, was required (Arvidsson, 2003). For the purpose of 
constructing the risk disclosure indexes, an extensive review of prior studies was 
undertaken (e.g. Hassan, 2009; Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). Therefore, 
for an item to be included, it must have been used in previous published disclosure 
studies. Hence, the following steps were taken as the basis for the development of the 
risk disclosure indices for this study:  
 
Step 1: A comprehensive review of the prior risk disclosure literature was undertaken 
(e.g. ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Hassan, 2009; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Al-Shammari, 
2014; Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). Based on this, the researcher identified 
some items which were used in previous studies. Therefore, the annual reports of 
listed Saudi banks should contain and disclose. 
 
Step 2: A review of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI, 2014) and Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB, 2007) risk 
disclosure sections to identify the risk disclosure items that should be included in listed 
Islamic banks’ annual reports was undertaken. Due to the nature of the sample of this 
study, an Islamic index had to be developed. 
 Step 3: The two indices were reviewed with 2 independent researchers who deal with 
both Islamic and conventional bank reports and specialize in the area of disclosure 
and financial reporting to enhance the validity of the study, indexes and results. 
 
Therefore, two risk disclosure indices were developed solely for the purpose of 
measuring the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. This is similar to 
the approach used by prior voluntary risk disclosure investigations (e.g. Hassan, 2009; 
Abdullah et al., 2015). The two indices included between them a total of 67 items that 
were expected to be published in the annual reports of the sample banks. The non-
Islamic risk disclosure index included 54 items, which were divided across 8 categories: 
accounting policies, financial and other risks, derivative hedging and general risks, 
financial instruments, reserves, segment information, business risk and compliance 
with regulations. While, the Islamic risk disclosure index included 67 items, which were 
distributed across 10 categories: accounting policies, financial and other risks, 
derivative hedging and general risks, financial instruments, reserves, segment 
information, business risk, compliance with regulations, Islamic bank risk 
characteristics and AAIOFI standards. This categorization of the two crafted risk 
disclosure indexes is due to the nature of the listed Saudi banks, where listed banks 
represent two sets of banks, namely Islamic banks and conventional banks, which are 
vigorously offering banking services in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, one of the important 
issues during crafting the disclosure index was deciding whether some items should 
be weighted more heavily (i.e. important) than others. In accounting research, both 
weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices are utilized (Cooke, 1989; Marston and 
Shrives, 1991; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Raffournier, 1995). For the purpose of this study, 
the un-weighted disclosure index was chosen because the study does not focus on a 
particular user group (Alsaeed, 2006; Naser et al., 2006). Instead the study addresses 
all users of annual reports, and therefore there is no need to confer different 
importance levels to the disclosed risk items (Oliveira et al., 2006). The contents of 
each bank’s annual reports were compared to the items listed in the Appendix, and on 
the basis of a dichotomous model they were coded as 1 if disclosed or 0 if otherwise. 
This index coincides with other studies that quantify the extent of disclosure (Al-
Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Oliveira et al., 2006). 
 
The total score for a bank is: 
   TD= ∑ di
n
i=1  
Where d = 1 if the item is disclosed; 0 = if the item is not disclosed; n = number of 
items.   
Reliability and Validity of Disclosure Indices 
Weber (1988) argued that the classification procedure should be reliable and valid. 
The reliability and validity of content analysis approaches need to be reviewed 
carefully. In human-scored schemes, reliability, that is the reproducibility of the 
measurement, is a major concern (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). The preceding studies argued that content analysis is not reliable if it is 
conducted only once or only by one specific person (Neuendorf, 2002). Consequently, 
to ensure the content validity of the initial research instrument, it was reviewed 
independently by two other researchers. Subsequently, after the researcher received 
the independent researcher’s comments and suggestions. A fourth experienced 
academic was required to discuss any ambiguities raised. The final disclosure 
checklist included 67 items. In terms of validity the research instruments (disclosure 
indices) are valid if they can measure what they claim to measure (Field, 2009). In this 
study the indices have measure what they claimed to measure, therefore the 
researcher can safely claim that the research instruments are valid. To ensure the 
reliability of the research instrument, the author and the two independent researchers 
scored three randomly selected banks. Then, the results from the three researchers 
were compared. Given that the final research disclosure indices were agreed by all 
researchers, differences in the compliance scores from the researchers were 
insignificant. This method was adopted by Marston and Shrives (1991), who argued 
that the index scores awarded to firm could be considered reliable if other researchers 
could replicate the same results.  The final disclosure checklists are presented in the 
following table:  
 
Table1: Ensuring validity of research instrument  
 
Categories 
Items 
suggested 
by author 
Items 
suggested 
by first 
independent 
researcher 
Items 
suggested 
by second 
independent 
researcher 
Final index 
after 
consultation 
Weight 
Accounting 
Policies 
12 13 9 10 15% 
Financial risks 15 18 10 15 22.5% 
Derivatives 
hedging and 
General Risk 
Info 
1 3 2 11 16.5% 
Financial 
instruments 
3 2 3 2 3% 
Reserves 4 3 2 3 4% 
Segment 
information 
2 2 2 2 3% 
Business risk  5 3 4 5 7.5% 
Compliance 
with 
regulations 
7 11 3 6 9% 
Islamic Bank 
Risk 
characteristics 
9 9 9 9 13.5% 
AAIOFI 
Standards 
5 4 4 4 6% 
Total 73 75 56 67 100% 
The weight is calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (67). 
For example: weight of Accounting Policies = 10/67*100= 15% 
Descriptive analysis and Discussion 
This section presents the results of the analysis and the resultant discussion. The 
results are generally based on the outcome of the descriptive statistics of disclosure 
levels and rankings related to the risk categories. 
 
Recently, there has been an increase in users’ demands for corporate information. 
The literature reveals that companies have been put under immense pressure to make 
even greater disclosures of corporate information, especially in relation to risks and 
uncertainties. This is the background against which the results of this study should be 
interpreted. This study sets out to examine the levels of risk disclosure amongst listed 
Saudi banks. Tables 1 and 2 display the results of the content analysis. The tables 
show that all banks in the sample disclosed risk-relevant information. Furthermore, the 
results displayed in tables 3, 4 and 5 below show that on average the level of risk 
disclosure steadily increased across the period under study, rising from 52% in 2009 
to 77% in 2013; however, the highest score recorded was 78% in 2011 by Banque 
Saudi Fransi. This provides evidence that there was an upward trend in the average 
amount of risk disclosure being published by the sampled banks over the period from 
2009 to 2013. The average disclosure, regardless of the universal items or Islamic 
items, increased overall.  
 
Table 2:  Average risk disclosure level for Non-Islamic Banks from 2009 to 2013  
Categories Saudi 
Investment 
Bank 
Arab 
National 
Bank 
National 
Commercial 
Bank 
Banque 
Saudi 
Fransi 
SAMBA Saudi 
Hollandi 
Bank 
SAAB Riyad 
Bank 
Average 
Accounting 
Policies 
66% 73% 
 
77% 
 
69% 
 
64% 
 
82% 
 
66% 
 
73% 
 
71% 
Financial and 
other Risks 
100% 
 
81% 
 
87% 
 
91% 
 
60% 
 
90% 
 
92% 
 
93% 
 
87% 
Derivative 
Hedging and 
General 
Risks 
45% 
 
58% 
 
36% 
 
73% 
 
18% 
 
47% 
 
49% 
 
49% 
 
47% 
Financial 
Instruments 
50% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
56% 
Reserves 
 
67% 
 
100% 67% 100% 100% 
 
100% 
 
66% 
 
100% 
 
88% 
Segment 
Information 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
75% 
Business 
Risk 
 
60% 
 
52% 
 
60% 
 
52% 
 
60% 
 
60% 
 
40% 
 
44% 
 
54% 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
67% 
 
66% 
 
67% 
 
76% 
 
67% 
 
67% 
 
83% 
 
67% 
 
70% 
Average 69% 73% 74% 70% 59% 68% 68% 66% 68% 
Notes: The disclosure score for each risk disclosure level is calculated as a ratio of the actual total items 
disclosed in the annual reports for each bank divided by the 54 items included in the risk disclosure 
index for non-Islamic and divided by the 67 items included in the risk disclosure index for the Islamic 
banks. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis for the level of corporate risk disclosure and its 
categories in the annual reports of all listed non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. In 
general, what should be noted when observing the table above is that, from a merely 
quantitative point of view, the total risk disclosure per index reveals that Saudi non-
Islamic banks on average reported more risk disclosure than their Islamic 
counterparties. This is consistent with Abdallah et al. (2015). Furthermore, the results 
indicate that the total risk disclosure in non-Islamic banks was 68%, with the most 
common risk disclosure categories in the annual reports of the sampled banks being 
reserves (88%), financial and other risks (87%), segment information (75%), 
accounting policies (71%), compliance with regulations (70%), financial instruments 
(56%), business risk (54%) and derivative hedging (47%).  
 
However, in terms of reporting risk disclosure levels per category for all non-Islamic 
banks in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Hollandi bank scored the highest in the first category 
namely accounting policies (82%). In second place, came the National Commercial 
bank by scoring (77%). Where, in third place, came jointly the Arab National bank and 
Riayd bank by obtaining a score of (73%). The Banque Saudi Fransi came fourth in 
the accounting policies category by scoring (69%). In fifth place, jointly came the Saudi 
Investment bank and SAAB bank by achieving a score of (66%). SAMBA bank came 
last in the accounting policies category by achieving an overall score of (64%). While, 
in the second category financial and other risks, the Saudi Investment banks achieved 
the highest score (100%), secondly, came Riyad bank (93%), thirdly SAAB bank 
acquiring a score of (92%), fourthly came the Banque Saudi Fransi at (91%), next 
came the Saudi Hollandi bank at (90%), then the National Commercial bank came by 
obtaining a score of (87%), in seventh place, the National Arab bank came by scoring 
(81%) in the financial risk category, where SAMBA also came last in this category by 
a large difference (60%). Moreover, the third category is the derivative hedging, which 
is the lowest category where most non-Islamic banks scored below the (49%). It also 
has the lowest average of all non-Islamic banks at (47%). The fourth category is the 
financial instruments category, which is the only category where all non-Islamic banks 
from this study’s sample achieved a score of (50%) except the National Commercial 
bank which have achieved a score of (100%).  Next comes the reserves category 
where the Arab National bank, Banque Saudi Fransi, SAMBA, Saudi Hollandi bank 
and Riyad bank acquired in this category (100%), while secondly came together the 
Saudi investment bank and the National Commercial bank at a score of (67%) which 
is low compared to the first 5 banks in this category, lastly in the reserves category 
came SAAB bank at (66%). In the sixth category, namely segment information the 
banks split into two groups where Saudi investment bank, Arab National bank, 
National Commercial bank and SAAB obtained a score of (100%), while Banque Saudi 
Fransi, SAMBA, Saudi Hollandi bank and Riyad bank achieved a score of (50%). In 
the business risk category, the Saudi Investment banks, the National Commercial 
bank, SAMBA and the Saudi Hollandi bank all achieved a score of (60%), while the 
Arab National bank and the Banque Saudi Fransi together scored (52%). In this 
category Riyad bank achieved (44%), also in the same category SAAB bank obtained 
(40%). Finally in the compliance with regulations category, the highest score was 
acquired by SAAB bank at (83%), the second highest score was achieved by Banque 
Saudi Fransi at (76%). While in this category Saudi investment bank, National 
Commercial bank, SAMBA, Saudi Hollandi bank and Riyad bank all scored the same 
at (67%), the Arab National bank scored (66%) in the compliance with regulations 
category.  
 
However, looking at it in terms of the average risk disclosure reporting per bank of the 
8 non-Islamic banks listed on the Saudi stock market the National Commercial Bank 
was the highest, scoring 74%, followed by the National Arab Bank came second, 
scoring 73%, then the Banque Saudi Fransi at 70%, fourthly the Saudi Investment 
bank at a score of 69%. Also, in terms of average risk reporting the Saudi Hollandi 
bank and SAAB bank scored the same at 68%, followed by Riyad bank with little 
difference between them (66%). Finally, SAMBA Bank came last, scoring only 59% in 
the overall average of all categories per bank.  
 
Table 3: Average risk disclosure level for Islamic Banks (2009 – 2013) 
Categories  ALJAZIRA ALRAJHI ALINMA ALBILAD Average   
Accounting Policies 64% 75% 71% 
 
83% 73% 
 
67% 
  
Financial and other Risks  68% 72% 70% 
 
72% 71% 
 
Derivative Hedging  and general risks 55% 69% 56% 
 
29% 52% 
 
Financial Instruments  100% 80% 50% 40% 68% 
  
Reserves  
 
100% 100% 67% 
 
67% 84% 
 
Segment Information  60% 70% 50% 
 
80% 65% 
 
Business Risk  
 
44% 48% 48% 
 
60% 50% 
 
Compliance with regulations 
 
70% 83% 77% 
 
66% 74% 
 
Islamic Bank Risk Characteristics  73% 54% 44% 
 
49% 55% 
 
38% 
AAOIFI Standards  30% 25% 0% 
 
25% 20% 
 
Average  66% 68% 53% 57% 61%  
 
Table 2 shows that the average risk disclosure among Islamic banks was 61%, while 
on average the most frequently reported risk categories amongst listed Islamic banks 
in Saudi Arabia were reserves (84%), compliance with regulation (74%), accounting 
policies (73%), financial and other risks (71%), financial instruments (68%), segment 
information (65%), Islamic bank risk characteristics (55%), derivative hedging and 
general risks (52%), business risk (50%) and Islamic standards (20%). However, the 
most frequently reported categories among all banks (Islamic banks as well as non-
Islamic banks) were reserves (88%), financial and other risks (87%) for non-Islamic 
(see tables 1) and reserves and compliance with regulations (74%) for Islamic banks 
(see tables 2). The two most infrequently reported categories among the Islamic banks 
were Islamic standards (20%) and business risk (50%) and for non-Islamic were 
derivative hedging and general risks (47%) and business risk (54%), (see table 1). 
However, in terms of reporting risk disclosure levels per category for all Islamic banks 
in Saudi Arabia, the Albilad bank achieved the highest score in the first category 
namely accounting policies at a score of (83%), while, Alrajhi bank, which is the largest 
Islamic banks in the country came second in the accounting policies category by 
achieving a score of (75%). In third place came the Alinma bank, which is the newest 
bank in Saudi Arabia, being established in 2008 scoring (71%), (Alinma bank, 2015). 
While, in last place came Aljazira bank, which in 2007 shifted from being a 
conventional bank to a fully sharia-compliant bank by scoring (64%), (Aljazira bank, 
2015). The second category is the financial and other risks. In this category Albilad 
bank and Alrajhi bank jointly scored the highest among the Islamic at (72%). Secondly, 
the Alinma bank achieved in this category a score of (70%), where Aljazira bank came 
last by acquiring a score of (68%). However, in the derivative hedging and general risk 
information, Alrajhi bank scored the highest at (69%), in second place Alinma bank 
scored (56%), followed by Aljazira bank by a very close score at (55%) and coming 
last at a very low score at this category is Albilad bank (29%). In the financial 
instruments category, Aljazira bank topped all Islamic banks by obtaining a score of 
(100%). Alrajhi bank scored second top at (80%), while Alinma bank and Aljazira bank 
score considerably low at the financial instruments category at (50%), (40%) 
respectively. Moreover, Aljazira and Alrajhi banks jointly acquired the highest scores 
in the reserves category (100%). This could be attributed to large size both banks 
enjoy, where both banks had the largest total assets over the sample period. Also, in 
the same category Alinma and Albilad banks jointly acquired a score of (67%). In the 
segment information category, Albilad bank came first with a score of (80%), followed 
by Alrajhi bank with a score of (70%), then Aljazira bank with a score of (60%), and 
followed by Alinma bank with a score of (50%). While, in the business risk category 
Albilad scored (60%), where in second place came jointly Alrajhi and Alinma banks at 
(48%), followed by Aljazira bank with a score of (44%). Whereas, in the compliance 
with regulations Alrajhi bank scored the highest score at (83%), then Alinma bank 
came second with a score of (77%), followed by Aljazira bank with a score of (70%) 
and in fourth place came Albilad bank at (66%). Moreover, in the Islamic bank risk 
characteristics category, Aljazira bank acquired the highest score of (73%), in second 
place came Alrajhi bank with a score of (54%), and followed by in third place Albilad 
bank with a score of (49%), then by Alinma bank with a score of (44%). In the last 
category, named the AAOIFI standards Aljazira scored the highest at (30%), followed 
by jointly Alrajhi and Albilad banks with a score of (25%) and in last place came Alinma 
bank with zero percent.  
 However, over the sampled period, amongst the Islamic banks Alrajhi Bank had on 
average the highest score at 68% in terms of risk disclosure per bank. In second place 
in terms of risk reporting per bank, Aljazira bank achieved a score of (66%). Thirdly, 
Albilad bank on average per bank scored (57%), while Alinma Bank had the lowest 
score of (53%).  
Further Discussion 
Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis for the level of corporate risk disclosure and its 
categories in the annual reports of listed non-Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. In general, 
what should be noted when observing the table above is that, from a merely 
quantitative point of view, the total risk disclosure per index reveals that Saudi non-
Islamic banks on average reported more risk disclosure than their Islamic 
counterparties. This could be a reflection of the inherently conservative nature of the 
principles that guide Islamic financial institutions, which aim to provide financial 
products that serve the interests of society more broadly than do non-Islamic banks, 
which are more likely to be oriented towards the pursuit of profit maximization. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the total risk disclosure in non-Islamic banks was 
68%.  
On the other hand, table 2 illustrates the descriptive analysis for the level of corporate 
risk disclosure and its categories in the annual reports of listed Islamic banks. It reveals 
that the average level of risk disclosure among Islamic banks was 61%. However, 
table 1 and 2 indicate that Islamic banks were more likely to report risk disclosure than 
non-Islamic banks in the areas of accounting policies, derivatives hedging and general 
risk information, financial instruments and compliance with regulations categories. 
This is concurrent with Abdallah et al. (2015). It is worth noting, however, that the 
difference in the risk disclosure between Islamic banks and non-Islamic banks is not 
momentous for the overall and all-risk categories. Generally, this suggests that on 
average the two groups reported a similar amount of risks. However, when comparing 
the overall risk disclosure levels of all 12 listed Saudi banks in this study with disclosure 
levels in previous studies, such as Amran et al. (2008) (74.5%), Deumes and Kneckel 
(2008) (87.3%) and Maffei et al. (2014) (84.8%), the sample banks’ score was 
relatively low at 64%. This signifies that listed Saudi banks still have to improve upon 
their corporate risk disclosure levels so as to improve the overall risk disclosure 
practices among the banking industry, which will result in well-informed investors and 
more effective decision making practices. This was confirmed by the ICAEW (1999), 
who advised quantifying risk whenever possible to improve the quality of risk reporting. 
Basically, the quantification of risk by managers in the annual reports results in the 
overall enhancement of risk disclosure quality. This leads to investors being able to 
make more informed investment decisions.  Moreover, Islamic banks (67%) and non-
Islamic banks (68%) disclosed almost the same amount of risk in terms of the universal 
items, which are the first 8 categories of the risk disclosure index (see appendix). 
Islamic banks only reported (38%) regarding Islamic items, the last two categories of 
the Islamic banks risk disclosure index (see appendix). 
It is evident that the sample banks reported more non-financial information then 
specific financial information. Looking at the above tables, on average the total number 
of banks examined for the purpose of this investigation reported most on the same 
nonfinancial category, namely, reserves. Empirical studies in different contexts have 
provided similar results (Rajab and Schachler, 2009; Woods and Reber, 2003, 
Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013).  The total Saudi banks scored 79% on financial and other 
risks category, which is more than the average reported by previous studies, such as 
Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) (4.55%) and Maffei et al. (2014) (30%). The tables below 
show the average per year over the entire sample period of all banks. 
Table 4: Average risk disclosure of each Islamic bank (per year) 
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Table 5: Average risk disclosure of each Non-Islamic bank (per year) 
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Table 6: Average risk disclosure of each Non-Islamic bank (per year) 
Saudi Investment  
Bank 
Arab National  
Bank 
National Commercial  
Bank 
Banque Saudi  
Fransi 
20
09 
20
10 
20
11 
20
12 
20
13 
20
09 
20
10 
20
11 
20
12 
20
13 
20
09 
20
10 
20
11 
20
12 
20
13 
20
09 
20
10 
20
11 
20
12 
20
13 
68
% 
69
% 
69
% 
74
% 
67
% 
67
% 
72
% 
69
% 
77
% 
77
% 
74
% 
74
% 
74
% 
75
% 
75
% 
70
% 
66
% 
78
% 
74
% 
62
% 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the descriptive statistics for the scores of the risk disclosure 
levels for each year of the sample period for the individual banks. Table 1 displays the 
average risk disclosure of each Islamic bank per year. It can be seen from this table 
that Aljazira Bank witnessed a drop in terms of reporting risk disclosure from 68% in 
2009 to 64% in 2012 before increasing up again to 71% in 2013. Such fluctuations in 
risk reporting over the period could be attributed to new board members joining or due 
to new corporate governance measures adopted.  However, as demonstrated in table 
1 Alrajhi bank witnessed a decrease throughout the entire period, despite being the 
largest bank in terms of total assets and profitability. This decrease effect could be 
attributed to other corporate governance factors, such as changes in disclosure policy 
or changes in the top management.   Albilad bank witnessed a steady increase in the 
levels of risk disclosure over the first 4-years of the period before decreasing to 60% 
in 2013. This effect could be due to steady profitability levels over the latter 4 years of 
the examined period. While, Alinma bank witnessed the no changer effect in the levels 
of voluntary risk disclosure for the first 2-year, followed by a very little decrease in the 
subsequent year before soaring up again over the last 2-year of the period. This could 
be only attributed to trying new reporting strategy by management.    
 
On the other hand, tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that most of the individual non-Islamic 
banks witnessed overall steady increases in the levels of risk disclosure over the 
sample period, which could be attributed to the same levels of profitability of these 
banks. However, Banque Saudi Fransi witnessed large changes over the period in its 
risk reporting levels, starting in 2009 at 70%, followed by a slight decrease to 66% in 
2010, then soaring up to 78% in 2011, scoring the highest score of the entire sample 
through the whole period, then once again dropping to 74% in 2012 and reaching the 
lowest score 62% in 2013. This could be due to changes in the board of directors, 
since some board members tend to lean toward a specific disclosure strategy. 
Contrastingly, SAMBA Bank observed no changes in its reporting levels over the 
sample period.  
 
Overall, the above tables indicate that the majority of banks witnessed an increase in 
their risk reporting levels over the 5-year period. This provides evidence that there was 
an upward trend in the average amount of risk disclosure being published by the 
sampled banks over the period from 2009 to 2013. There is only one possible 
explanation for this trend, which is that all of the sampled banks were following the 
international financial reporting standards as well as the national accounting standards 
(IFRS, 2011), requiring them to apply the IFRS7, which makes it categorically clear 
that disclosure is mandatory. This could be confirmation that regulation is the most 
powerful driver of the increases in the levels of corporate risk disclosure (Adamu, 2013; 
Lipunga, 2014). Furthermore, some studies have documented that the amount of 
information disclosed by organizations has increased substantially over the past few 
years in part due to regulations (Oliveira et al., 2011a; Leuz, 2010) and that there has 
been a rise in voluntary information provided by companies (Oliveira et al., 2011a; 
Campbell and Slack, 2008). In addition, other studies have reported that firms react to 
new requirements (Miihkinen, 2012) by increasing the amount of disclosure relating to 
either specific risk items (Roulstone, 1999) or specific sections of their annual reports.  
Table 7: Banks Descriptive Information 
Banks Disclosure Level Year Firm-Specific Characteristics Variables 
LOG Size Profitability Leverage Auditor 
Dummy (1-0) 
ALJAZIRA 68%  
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
7.48 0.1% 8.98% 1 
ALRAJHI 75% 8.23 4.06% 3.57% 1 
ALINMA 52%  7.24 1.78% 0 1 
ALBILAD 53% 7.24 -1.48% 1.14% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.27 2.52% 4.96% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 67% 7.77 0.22% 13.76 1 
SABB 66% 8.10 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Riyad Bank 65% 8.25 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 68% 7.70 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Arab National Bank 67% 8.04 2.08% 10.99% 1 
National Commercial Bank 74% 8.41 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 70%  8.08 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALJAZIRA 66%  
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
7.52 0.09% 1.18% 1 
ALRAJHI 74% 8.27 3.81% 2.93% 1 
ALINMA 52%  7.43 0.07% 8.45 1 
ALBILAD 53% 7.32 1.78% 57.67% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.27 2.39% 11.57% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 67% 7.73 1.48% 9.08% 1 
SAAB 72% 8.10 1.78% 8.23% 1 
Riyad Bank 65% 8.24 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 69% 7.71 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Arab National Bank 72% 8.06 1.71% 14.56% 1 
National Commercial Bank 74% 8.45 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 66%  8.09 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALJAZIRA 64%  
 
 
 
 
 
2011 
7.59 0.9% 5.93% 1 
ALRAJHI 67% 8.34 3.64% 3.18% 1 
ALINMA 51%  7.57 1.36% 6.64% 1 
ALBILAD 54% 7.44 1.78% 1.52% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.29 2.27% 10.7% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 67% 7.76 1.93% 8.99% 1 
SAAB 68% 8.14 2.3% 7.24% 1 
Riyad Bank 67% 8.26 1.78% 3.55% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 69% 7.72 1.78% 11.79% 1 
Arab National Bank 69% 8.07 1.88% 10.95% 1 
National Commercial Bank 74% 8.48 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 78%  8.15 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALJAZIRA 64%  
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
7.71 1.17% 8.41% 1 
ALRAJHI 55% 8.43 3.23% 0.84% 1 
ALINMA 56%  7.73 1.61% 8.24% 1 
ALBILAD 66% 7.47 3.28% 1.92% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.30 2.21% 6% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 70% 7.84 2.08% 11.77% 1 
SAAB 68% 8.19 2.27% 6.75% 1 
Riyad Bank 66% 8.28 1.87% 3.24% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 74% 7.77 1.69% 14% 1 
Arab National Bank 77% 8.14 1.89% 9.15% 1 
National Commercial Bank 75% 8.54 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 74%  8.20 1.78% 9.24% 1 
ALJAZIRA 71%  
 
 
 
 
 
2013 
7.78 1.78% 57.67% 1 
ALRAJHI 67% 8.45 2.72% 1.3% 1 
ALINMA 56%  7.80 1.72% 32.84% 1 
ALBILAD 60% 7.56 1.78% 57.67% 1 
SAMBA 59% 8.31 2.23% 3.64% 1 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 70% 7.91 2.13% 13.03% 1 
SAAB 68% 8.25 2.33% 5.17% 1 
Riyad Bank 66% 8.31 2% 5.64% 1 
Saudi Investment Bank 67% 7.91 1.9% 14.69% 1 
Arab National Bank 77% 8.14 1.78% 6.76% 1 
National Commercial Bank 75% 8.58 1.78% 57.67% 1 
Banque Saudi Fransi 62%  8.23 1.58% 6.35% 1 
 
As can be observed from the table above, the National Commercial Bank is the highest 
ranked bank in terms of its voluntary risk disclosure score over the entire sample 
period. It is also the largest listed bank on the Saudi stock market in terms of size (total 
assets). This result shows that the level of risk disclosure is positively correlated with 
size. This is consistent with previous risk disclosure studies that employed annual 
reports, such as Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Konishi 
and Mohobbot (2007), Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Vandemele et al. (2009) and 
Mousa and Elamir (2013), which confirmed that size is positively correlated with the 
level of risk disclosure. This outcome is also in line with signalling theory. According 
to signalling theory, larger companies rely more on external finance. Hence, they are 
incentivized to disclose more risk information in order to send a good signal to 
investors and creditors regarding their ability to manage risk. 
 
As has been established by prior investigation, leverage could affect the level of risk 
disclosure since the level of risk disclosure and the leverage ratio simultaneously 
increase or decrease. Moreover, firms with higher leverage are more likely to have a 
higher level of voluntary risk disclosure in their annual reports than those with lower 
leverage (Deumes and Knechel 2008; Hassan 2009; Marshall and Weetman 2007; 
Taylor et al., 2010). The table above shows that Alrajhi Bank’s risk disclosure levels 
decreased in tandem with the leverage ratio year by year over the entire sample period, 
confirming the above argument.  This is also concurrent with signalling theory, 
whereby managers tend to provide more risk management information to send a good 
signal to debt holders regarding corporate ability to meet obligations (Oliveira et al., 
2011b).    
 
The banks descriptive table above shows that SAMBA Bank had a consistent level of 
risk disclosure throughout the whole sample period. Yet, its profitability levels 
decreased year by year. This non-directional relationship illustrates that there is a 
negative association between the two variables. This is concurrent with Mousa and 
Elamir (2013), who reported a negative relationship between profitability and risk 
disclosure levels. Furthermore, applying signalling theory could mean that those firms 
that are better at risk management will have higher levels of relative profitability and 
would want to signal their superior risk management abilities to the market place via 
voluntary disclosures in the annual report.  
 
Auditor type has been suggested as a factor in explaining variations in voluntary risk 
disclosure levels (Al-Shammari, 2014). Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that larger audit firms are less likely to be associated with clients that disclose 
lower levels of information in their annual reports.  Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) 
claimed that these larger and better known auditing firms tend to encourage their 
clients to disclose more risk information to maintain their own reputation. The 
international Big 4 auditing firms are more likely to pressure their clients to disclose 
risk information in their annual reports to assure the shareholders regarding the 
quantity of risk that their companies face. However, the consistently changing levels 
of voluntary risk disclosure over the examined period, as can be seen from the table 
above, indicate that auditor type had no effect on the levels of voluntary risk disclosure 
in the sample banks of this study. Indeed, one of the Big 4 accounting firms audited 
all banks included in this investigation, which proves that there is no correlation 
between auditor type and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. 
Nevertheless, the choice of an external auditor can serve as one signal of a firms’ 
value. For example, Craswell and Taylor (1992) showed that listed firms are more 
likely to choose one of the Big 4 auditing firms. Such a choice signals to investors that 
the auditing of the contents of the annual reports is of high quality.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, the ICAEW (1999) advised firms to quantify risk whenever possible to 
improve the quality of risk reporting. Basically, the quantification of risk by managers 
in annual reports results in the overall enhancement of risk disclosure quality. It 
improves the bank’s image and sends a good signal to investors and creditors, which 
attracts more capital. It also enhances investors’ decision-making practices. Finally, it 
is an opportunity for managers to show their skills and abilities in relation to quantifying 
risk information in their annual reports to the market, which can improve their career 
prospects.  
 
This study sought to empirically investigate the level of voluntary risk disclosure in the 
annual reports of all listed banks on the Saudi stock market from 2009 to 2013. This 
study used the manual content analysis approach to measure voluntary risk disclosure 
by counting the number of words disclosed by the sample banks in their annual reports. 
The empirical analysis showed that overall Islamic banks reported less risk information 
than non-Islamic banks. However, the analysis also revealed that both types of banks 
reported relatively the same amount of risk information regarding the banks’ universal 
items and Islamic banks reported very little risk information on the Islamic risk 
disclosure items. Based on this, the following conclusion can be made: Islamic banks 
disclose less voluntary risk information than their non-Islamic counterparties. This 
outcome could be a reflection of the inherently conservative nature of the principles 
that guide Islamic financial institutions, which aim to provide financial products that 
serve the interests of society more broadly than non-Islamic firms, which are more 
likely to be oriented towards the pursuit of profit maximization. 
 
This investigation results have important implications for regulators in Saudi Arabia as 
they attempt to ensure information adequacy and the increased efficiency of the most 
rapidly developing capital market. The study is significant in that it sheds light on the 
voluntary risk-disclosing practices of banks that operate in an environment that is often 
considered to be opaque. 
 
Several limitations should be noted in this investigation. Firstly, this study used content 
analysis to measure voluntary risk disclosure by creating a risk disclosure index 
through simply adding up the number of risk-related words. Secondly, this study relied 
only on annual reports to measure risk disclosure levels. However, information about 
risk can be provided in sources other than annual reports, such as interim reports, 
press releases, conference calls, web sites or prospectuses. Thirdly, this study ignored 
the influence of corporate governance and corporate-specific characteristics on risk 
disclosure by financial and non-financial institutions as well as ignoring the 
determinants of voluntary risk disclosure. Future studies may examine these financial 
and non-financial institutions to provide a bigger picture of the impact of corporate 
governance and corporate specific characteristics on the levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. In spite of the noted limitations, the study did offer 
substantial insights into voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
 
This study suggests a number of other openings for future research. In the field of 
corporate risk disclosure in the Middle East, research could extend this study over a 
longer period of time or alternatively involve comparative studies with other Arab 
countries, such as the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) member states. Such studies 
could investigate the changes in corporate risk disclosures across time and compare 
potential variation in nations with different social, political and economic systems. This 
may also help researchers to understand why managers choose to disclose certain 
parts of risk information and withhold other parts. Additional research could be also 
undertaken to examine the economic consequences of risk reporting in annual reports 
(e.g., the effect on prices leading earnings, cost of capital, analyst following, firm value 
and characteristics of analysts' forecasts). 
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